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Abstract. The British Regulations of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act

2000 is one of the rst modern bills for mandatory disclosure of protected data in a democratic country. In this paper we compare this bill
from a technical point of view with the US key escrow proposal (EES)
and its variants and then, more generally we compare the merits of key
con scation vs key escrow.
A major problem with key escrow is that once a private key is recovered
it can be used to decipher ciphertexts which were sent well before a warrant was issued (or after its expiration). Several alternative key escrow
systems have been proposed in the literature to address this issue. These
are equitable, in the sense that the control of society over the individual
and the control of the individual over society are fairly shared. We show
that equitability is much easier to achieve with key con scation than
with key escrow. Consequently, although the RIP act was heavily criticized in the press and on the internet, it inherently maintains a better
level of privacy than key escrow.
Finally we present some practical deniable decryption variants of popular
public key systems.
Key words: RIP, key escrow, key con scation.

1 Introduction
Key escrow was proposed as a mechanism to protect society from criminals who
use encryption to block access to evidence of crime [3,22,9] (for a taxonomy
of key escrow systems see [10]). While the US key escrow proposal (EES) [9]
was never approved, the British Regulations of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act
2000 [25] has been enacted and is now law. The RIP act has been heavily criticized in the press and over the internet (see e.g. [27]). Indeed some internet
societies have considered boycotting Britain [21]. Moreover, the RIP act is being used as a test case by several other countries who are considering similar
?
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acts [23], so it could be used as an excuse by less democratic countries to weaken
the privacy that encryption provides. A critical analysis is therefore crucial.
The RIP act di ers in several respects from the EES. With RIP, it is the person to whom protected (encrypted) material is addressed who should disclose
the material, if a warrant for this purpose has been issued by the Secretary of
State [25]. Compliance may be achieved by \simply making a disclosure of the
relevant information in an intelligent form" [25, section 50(1,a)], but \shall require the disclosure of the (decryption) key, if the disclosure can only be complied
with the disclosure of the key itself" [25, section 51(1)].
Most of the ecient encryption schemes which are currently used (e.g. the
SSL [29]) are based on symmetric encryption. For these it would not be possible
to comply with the disclosure requirement unless the (symmetric) session keys
are revealed. Therefore it is most likely that with such schemes, key disclosure
will be required. However this is not the case with public key encryption schemes.
For example, with the RSA encryption scheme [26] compliance can be achieved
by simply disclosing the message(s) (the ciphertext must be the encryption of
the message). For the ElGamal encryption scheme [14] and DSS [13] disclosing
the message is not sucient: in this case the receiver must also, either reveal
the key or prove that the ciphertext is the encryption of the message with the
public key of the receiver (see Section 3.1).
It is important to note that with the RIP act, disclosure of the decryption
key(s) (or the decrypted ciphertext(s)) may only be required after an investigation has started. This is in contrast to key escrow, for which shares of the
decryption keys must be given to the escrow agencies before any investigation.
The RIP act clearly has some controversial aspects. For example, the penalty
for knowingly failing to comply1 with a disclosure warrant is \imprisonment for
a term not exceeding two years . .. " [25, section 53(5,a)], whereas tipping o
(e.g. an employee who tips o his security manager) can lead \to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding ve years . . . " [25, section 54(4,a)].
Although the RIP act may be somewhat controversial, the idea of con scating
a key is worth comparing with the concept of key escrow. There are several good
reasons for this. The most important one being that numerous papers have
already been published on key escrow (see e.g. [18,20, 2,17, 5,1]), and most of
its problems have been addressed. Furthermore, \key recovery" has often been
used as a synonym for key escrow and there are also several papers published on
this topic (e.g. in [7]). As far as we know there are no scienti c papers on key
con scation.
We do not claim that our study of key con scation covers all aspects. Indeed,
the idea of key escrow is by now (at least) 10 years old [3] and it has taken many
years to reach the present state of knowledge. Obviously current research on key
escrow will facilitate research on key con scation, but the fact that these notions
are quite di erent may imply new problems, still to be discovered.
We focus on a particular problem of key escrow that has received some attention. This problem has to do with the fact that, once the key has been recovered,
1
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it can be used to decipher ciphertexts sent well before the warrant was issued
and/or well after the warrant has expired. Several researchers have pointed out
this problem. Lenstra-Winkler-Yacobi [20] state that:
the key is supposed to be \returned" (!) at the expiration of the warrant,
but non-compliance with this or other Dept. of Justice procedures explicitly \shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other
objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence lawfully
acquired" [11].
It is no surprise therefore that alternative key escrow systems have been proposed
to address, to a certain extent, this issue (see e.g. [22, 20,17,5, 1]).
The strongest model proposed so far guarantees time-limited decryption even
when the escrow agencies are taken over unlawfully. For example, encrypted data
(ciphertexts) of law abiding citizens in a democratic society is protected even if
at a later date a dictatorship takes full control of the escrow agencies. BurmesterDesmedt-Seberry have proposed a scheme with this property [5] and give credit
to Gus Simmons [28] for having rst observed it. The scheme in [5] however
needs some interaction: with each public key updating, the receiver must send
this key to the sender (the escrow agencies do not need to do this).
In this paper we examine how to achieve such a time limitation when working with key con scation. We focus on proven security. This implies that the
following trivial key transport mechanism is excluded. The sender uses the public encryption key of the receiver to send the receiver a new signed session key.
Later, if the sender/receiver are forced to open a ciphertext, they just disclose
the session key, without revealing anything else. The problem with this approach
is that this is not proven secure. Indeed, given a ciphertext, it may be possible
for the parties involved to disclose a spurious key and a spurious message which
produce the same ciphertext. The one-time pad allows such deniable encryption [6]. Other deniable cryptosystems have been studied in [6]. The question
whether this is possible for DES is not known.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss attacks by di erent
parties in the context of key con scation. Since deniable encryption undermines
key con scation, we analyze it in Section 2.1. In Section 3 we discuss the issues
to guarantee equitable key con scation. Solutions are discussed in Section 4.
Before we end, in Section 5 we describe new methods to obtain practical deniable
encryption.

2 Attacks on key con scation
In this section we discuss some possible types of attack by di erent parties,
and in particular those attacks which to a large extent a ect the privacy of the
citizens.
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2.1 Attacks by citizens
There are several ways to bypass key con scation. As in the case of key escrow,
key con scation can be bypassed by using, for example, information hiding techniques (see e.g., [24]). However this approach does not not scale well and indeed
most private information is sent by parties who may not (or cannot) use information hiding technologies. It is therefore important to analyze key con scation
for the case when such technologies are not used.
Deniable encryption was proposed by Canetti-Dwork-Naor-Ostrovsky [6],
and makes it possible to open a ciphertext in di erent ways. This kind of encryption can therefore be used to undermine key con scation. The simplest example
of a deniable encryption scheme is the one-time pad. For this scheme, intercepted
encrypted data can be opened to produce any cleartext (for an appropriate key).
It is clear that key con scation is only e ective when the encryption is not
deniable, in other words when the encryption scheme corresponds to a commitment scheme.

2.2 Active attacks by law enforcement agencies
Active attacks by law enforcement agencies may seem unrealistic. However, the
RIP act clearly stipulates the involvement of the Secret Intelligence Service, the
GCHQ, and the Defence Intelligence (see e.g. [25, section 6]). Their mission may
not force them to limit themselves to passive attacks. Protection against active
attacks is therefore important.
To attack time-limited key con scation, law enforcement agencies can use
malleable attacks [12]. Let us consider such a type of attack in more detail.
Suppose that an agency wants to get hold of the plaintext M1 of a ciphertext
C1, sent before the time-limited warrant was granted, and suppose that a party
(e.g. an insider) is willing to help the law enforcement agency. For this purpose
the party can send a ciphertext C2 whose plaintext M2 will leak some information
about M1 . A particular case of this attack is a replay attack, for which C2 = C1.

3 Requirements
Although it is often common in modern cryptography to give formal models, we
will see that many of the models we need already exists. We therefore discuss
the requirements in a more informal way.

3.1 An introduction
It is obvious that for a public key encryption scheme which is also a commitment
scheme, the sender can comply with disclosure by simply revealing the message
and the randomness used.
If no randomness is used, as for example with RSA, then disclosure of the
message it is sucient. If randomness is used, as for example with ElGamal or
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DSS, then the receiver does not know the randomness (if the discrete logarithm
is hard). However in this case it is still possible for the receiver to comply with
the disclosure notice without revealing any private keys. For this purpose the
receiver must use an interactive zero-knowledge proof [16] to prove that the
ciphertext is the encryption of the plaintext with the public key of the receiver
(a proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm [8] can be used for ElGamal or
DSS).
Note that the RIP act states that [25, Section 50(5)]:
It shall not be necessary, for the purpose of complying with the requirement, for the person given notice to make a disclosure of any keys in
addition to those the disclosure of which is, alone, sucient to enable
the person to whom they are disclosed to obtain access to the information
and to put it into an intelligible form.
So with public key encryption schemes the receiver can comply with the RIP act
without having revealing the encryption keys.
If public keys are used to distribute the session keys of a symmetric encryption
scheme (as in SSL), then disclosure is complied by simply revealing the session
keys.

3.2 Undeniable key con scation
Revealing the randomness used, or proving that the message and ciphertext are
properly linked with the public key of the receiver, is only an e ective means
of disclosure from the point of view of enforcement agency if the encryption
scheme is not deniable. We call such schemes, undeniable. As mentioned earlier,
undeniable encryption schemes are also commitment schemes. For the sake of
completeness and to avoid any ambiguity (due to the de nition of blobs in [4])
we give the de nition below.

De nition 1. Let C be the ciphertext and E be the encryption function with

k the receiver's public key. The encryption system E is undeniable if, for all
ciphertexts C, for all plaintexts m; m , and for all random choices r; r ,
0

0

C = Ek (m; r) = Ek (m ; r ) implies m = m .
0

0

0

If no randomness is used, as in the case of RSA, we take the randomness to be
the empty string. So the de nition is suciently general. As we know RSA does
not o er the security of schemes that use randomness [15].

3.3 Sender and receiver coercibility
Canetti-Dwork-Naor-Ostrovsky[6] observed that both the sender and the receiver can be coerced into revealing the message. Since this is the goal of key
con scation, we de ne the following.
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De nition 2. An undeniable encryption scheme is receiver coercible if, given

a ciphertext C = Ek (m; r), with k the public key of the receiver, the receiver
can produce the randomness r and the plaintext m. An undeniable encryption
scheme which does not have this property is only sender coercible .
Although receiver coercibility is an important property for fair key con scation, a weaker form allows the receiver to prove that the revealed message is the
correct one.
De nition 3. An undeniable encryption scheme is receiver coercible with proof
if, given C = Ek (m; r) the receiver can prove in zero-knowledge that the revealed
plaintext m is correct.
Note that the ElGamal scheme is an example of an undeniable encryption
scheme which is receiver coercible with proof, but it is not receiver coercible (if
the discrete logarithm is hard).
We are now in a position to discuss equitable key con scation.

3.4 Equitable key con scation
Since we do not have escrow agencies with key con scation, it may seem that
one should not be concerned with the possibility of unlawful government action.
This would make our analysis much simpler.
However, this impression is wrong. After a coup all senders of messages may
be forced to reveal the plaintext-randomness pairs (m; r) of ciphertexts C =
Ek (m; r) sent long before the coup. A scheme that protects against such an
attack is called equitable .
A weaker form of equitability requires that the tevealing of randomness does
not leak anything additional about an unrevealed plaintext m of a ciphertext
C = Ek (m; r). We call this weak equitability .

4 Solutions
We now consider two solutions.

Solution 1. A probabilistic public key encryption scheme which is secure against

known-plaintext attacks and is also a commitment scheme, is an undeniable key
con scation scheme which is equitable against passive attacks by the law enforcement agency who coerces the sender.

This follows immediately from the de nitions, e.g. of known-plaintext attack. For
equitability, we assume that it is legal for all senders to erase the randomness
used after a certain time limit.

Solution 2. The Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme [15] is an undeniable
key con scation scheme which is sender/receiver coercible.

Indeed, the trapdoor (the factorization of n) can be used to nd the randomness
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of the sender. However, equitability is limited to the passive case, when the law
enforcement agency does not coerce the receiver. Indeed, since the sender knows
the trapdoor that is needed to compute the randomness, only weak equitability
can be obtained relative to the sender.
A public key scheme which is secure against chosen-text attacks and which
is also a commitment scheme, is an undeniable key con scation scheme which
is sender equitable against active attacks by the law enforcement agency. Such
practical schemes have been considered in the literature , e.g., in [30].

5 New deniable encryption schemes
Before we conclude we discuss some new ways to achieve deniable encryption.
A deniable encryption scheme [6] allows the sender to open the ciphertext as
any message. Canetti-Dwork-Naor-Ostrovsky's work focused on the case when
the message space is f0; 1g. A weaker de nition of deniability would allow the
sender to be able to deny having sent a speci c message by opening a di erent
message, not just any message. If the message space is f0; 1g, then of course the
two de nitions are identical. In many practical encryption schemes the cardinality of the message space is larger than two.

5.1 A heuristic scheme
Our scheme is a variant of the RSA encryption scheme.
Set-up: Alice chooses 4 di erent large primes p1, p2, p3 and p4 . She then computes n1 = p1  p2, n2 = p3  p4, n = p1  p2  p3  p4 , (n1 ) (the Carmichael
function2 of n [19]), (n2 ). Alice then chooses e1 2R Z(n1 ) and e2 2R Z(n2 ) .
Since (n) = lcm((n1 ); (n2)) she can compute the unique e modulo (n) such
that:
e = e1 mod (n1 )
e = e2 mod (n2 )
Alice publishes (e; n) as her public key and gives (e1 ; n1) and (e2 ; n2) to her
friends.

Encryption:

For Bob who is not a friend of Alice : Bob uses the normal RSA encryption.
The scheme is undeniable for Bob.
For Carol who is a friend of Alice : Carol uses the key (e1 ; n1) instead of (e; n).
Let M1 be the message that Carol wants to encrypt. Carol rst computes C1 =
M1e1 mod n1 . Then she chooses a C2 at random from Zn2 and uses the Chinese
Remainder Theorem to combine C1 and C2 uniquely into a C mod n. This is
(n) is the least positive integer for which we have b n = 1 mod n for all b 2 Zn .
2

( )

If n = pq, the product of two di erent odd primes, then (n) = lcm(p 1; q 1).
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the ciphertext she sends to Alice. If Alice is coerced, she produces the unique
message M which is such that C = M e mod n, which looks likely as random.
Observe that the e ective bandwidth for Carol is reduced. Can our techniques
be used to make high-bandwidth proven secure deniable encryption? Also, the
RSA is not a proven secure cryptosystem.

6 Conclusion
Although key con scation may not be constitutional in countries that protect
citizens against self incrimination, we have shown that it clearly has some privacy
advantages over key escrow.
In this paper we focused on the time-limited properties of key con scation
and observed that deniable encryption prevents undeniable key con scation. This
paper also opens several new research problems, in particular:
1. Since the US key escrow proposal is not mandatory while the British RIP act
is, it is worth studying the properties of key con scation in greater details. In
particular what other advantages/disadvantages does key con scation have
over key escrow?
2. The question on how to obtain equitability relative to the receiver for a
scheme which is also receiver coercible seems hard to address. A trivial, but
unacceptable solution would be for the sender to destroy his/her secret key.
Another trivial solution would be to update the public key on a regular basis,
but such a solution is too impractical.

Disclaimer
The authors have focused on technical aspects of privacy. It is not the goal of this
paper to endorse the British Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
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